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Transparency is one of the most influential themes in global environmental governance, however it has received
limited treatment in transboundary fisheries. Transparency is essential to ensure officials are held accountable
for the use of public resources and the achievement of environmental objectives, such as sustainable harvest.
Here, we use a case study approach to assess transparency in transboundary fisheries governance, evaluating
transshipment in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, one of the world’s most abundant and lucrative fish
eries. Transshipment at sea occurs extensively in these fisheries, but often lacks strong monitoring and oversight,
and has been associated with illegal or illicit activities. However, actors that rely heavily on transshipment at sea
maintain that it can be a legitimate part of the fish commodity chain, under effective regulation. Here we assess
whether at-sea transshipment in one of the most regulated and visible fisheries in the world is traceable, veri
fiable, and legal. Using AIS data and qualitative information from regional and sub-regional sources, we find that
68% of observed potential transshipments remain unsubstantiated even after triangulating with diverse data. We
identify three primary areas for improving traceability and transparency of transshipment at sea in the WCPO,
and suggest that transparency is ultimately hindered less by technical or administrative constraints, but by
tensions between the actors and objectives within management institutions. Increased transparency, and a focus
on the underlying dynamics that inhibit it, is necessary to ensure effective conservation and management of
transboundary fish stocks, now and in the future.

1. Introduction
The notion of transparency has been one of the most influential
themes in emerging global environmental governance in the last few
decades [1,2]. Its growing importance as an analytical lens, normative
standard, and policy tool are evident in right-to-know laws, open gov
ernment data programs, and vocal calls for the increasing availability of
public information emanating from public and private actors alike
[3–6]. Transparency takes many shapes, but perhaps the most frequently
cited definition is that transparency is “the degree to which information
is available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in
decisions and/or to assess the decisions made by insiders” [7]. Taking
this definition, transparency has three constitutive parts: it is about the
availability and flow of information, however it is also fundamentally

about to whom that information flows and for what purposes. As Mason
states, “transparency in governance is always relational: it is invoked to
support other, more primary, social purposes and values” [8]. While a
diversity of purposes and values may be supported by increased trans
parency [3,9], the most evident and most closely related to functions of
governance is that of accountability. In environmental governance,
accountability is conceived of as the obligation for public officials to
disclose the use of public resources, and their answerability to the public
to meet certain stated objectives, usually pertaining to environmental
processes and outcomes [4,10]. Presumably, transparency facilitates
accountability by providing sufficient information to enable greater
scrutiny of “political and economic power-wielders” by outsiders and
the less empowered [8]. This informational base is critically important,
as it is the necessary foundation for all subsequent functions of
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transparency, such as equity, legitimacy, and accountability.
Substantial literature promotes the importance of transparency in
the governance of diverse systems such as human rights, social media,
security, monetary policy, and corporate governance [9,11–13]. Within
environmental governance, transparency has become widely accepted
as an essential component in the governance of many industries such as
forestry, agriculture, and mining [11,14]. However, the concept has
received limited treatment in the realm of transboundary fisheries [9].
Transboundary fisheries are complex resource systems involving diverse
actors spanning multiple jurisdictions and requiring intensive resources
to manage; thus, they are particularly important systems in which to
consider the role of transparency. The primary institutions with a
mandate to manage transboundary fisheries are Regional Fisheries
Management Organizations (RFMOs), whose stated objectives are to
“ensure effective conservation and management” of fish stocks [15].
However, RFMOs have historically come under criticism for their
opacity [9,16]. In fact, the 2012 Sustainable Fisheries Resolution of the
United Nations General Assembly stated that it “urges regional fisheries
management organizations and arrangements to improve transparency
and to ensure that their decision-making processes are fair and trans
parent” [17]. Here, we use a case study approach to assess transparency
in transboundary fisheries governance by evaluating the degree to
which the public—broadly construed as those outside the membership
or governing structure of the RFMO—has sufficient information to hold
RFMOs accountable.
Some of the most abundant and lucrative transboundary fisheries in
the world are tuna fisheries [18]. Further, the largest tuna fishery in the
world is in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, accounting for more
than half of global tuna catches and more than $22 billion at final point
of sale [19,20]. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(WCPFC) is the RFMO charged with managing these fisheries, and is
often considered to exercise the best policy practices of any tuna RFMO
[21,22]. Here we evaluate transparency in the WCPFC as it relates to
tuna transshipment, which the WCPFC Convention defines as “the
unloading of all or any of the fish on board a fishing vessel to another
fishing vessel either at sea or in port” [23](Article 1 h). At-sea trans
shipment occurs extensively in the Western and Central Pacific tuna
fisheries; as of July 2019, WCPFC received reports for 7561 high seas
transshipment events since June 2010 when their management measure
on transshipment was first implemented. The numbers of reported high
seas events have also increased annually with 1092 events reported in
2017 [41]. This activity occurs especially in the tropical region for
species of albacore, bigeye, and yellowfin– enabling fishing vessels to
remain at sea on the fishing grounds for longer periods of time, thereby
reducing operating costs and maximizing fishing opportunities [24].
In-port transshipment is primarily conducted by carrier vessels at
designated anchorages in States’ territorial waters, but also occurs at sea
in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of some coastal States [25].
When these events occur in the Western and Central Pacific, they are
subject to the rules and regulations of the port or coastal State in which it
occurs [26]. However, at-sea transshipment is oftentimes conducted on
the high seas far from shore, with limited monitoring and oversight [24,
25]. As such, transshipment at sea has frequently been associated with
illegal or illicit activities, such as fish and money laundering, trade of
illicit commodities (e.g. drug or wildlife trafficking), labor violations,
and illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing [27–29]. Where
illegal activity is not associated, transshipment at sea still oftentimes
obscures the origins and destinations of fish commodities, inhibiting
efforts to improve sustainability, traceability, and transparency in fish
ing practices [24,30]. However, while this practice is often problematic,
governments and fishing enterprises that rely heavily on transshipment
at sea maintain that where transshipment is regulated, it can operate as a
legitimate part of the fish commodity chain [31]. The importance of
transshipment in the WCPFC is underlined by the recent establishment
of a working group, and allocation of substantial resources, toward the
review transshipment policies [32].

With this study, we seek to evaluate transparency in transboundary
fisheries governance using the case study of transshipment in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. We evaluate the degree to which the
public has sufficient information to assess whether regulated at-sea
transshipment is traceable, verifiable, and legal. To answer this ques
tion, we considered the most highly regulated and visible subsector
within the tuna RFMO considered to exercise best practices [21,22]: the
purse seine fishery in the primary tropical tuna waters in the WCPFC
convention area. We considered this fishery to be the most highly
regulated because of its requirements for 100% coverage by the WCPFC
vessel monitoring system (VMS) [33], 100% observer coverage on all
purse seine fishing vessels [34], 100% at-sea observer coverage for
carrier vessels, prohibition on at-sea transshipment (with limited ex
emptions) [26], and high levels of automatic identification system (AIS)
coverage relative to other fleets. Though limited in scope, our aim in
using this “best practices” case is to suggest that findings are likely
representative of transparency practices in transboundary fisheries more
broadly. The purpose of this study is first to assess whether highly
regulated at-sea transshipment in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
is in fact transparent and traceable to “outsiders” [7]. As mentioned
above, this is a necessary first step to evaluating the ultimate purposes of
transparency, including legitimacy and accountability. Second, we
identify gaps in the current monitoring and regulation of transshipment
at sea, and provide recommendations to address those gaps. Finally, we
discuss the implications of this study and the importance of improving
transparency and accountability for transboundary fisheries
management.
2. Methods
Multiple high quality data sources are available to the WCPFC
Commission, as well as member States, to enable them to evaluate
whether transshipment has been conducted in compliance with rules
and regulations. Specifically, the WCPFC VMS tracks the locations and
identities of all vessels registered within the WCPFC. The transshipment
declarations, annual reports, and observer reports further detail aspects
of transshipment, including vessels, gears, quantities of product trans
shipped, date, locations, and more [26]. However, data sharing rules
within the RFMO prohibit the public sharing of these data, and they are
only available to the Commission and member States under various re
strictions [35]. WCPFC information that is public domain includes the
Record of Fishing Vessels, which specifies any exemptions for purse
seine transshipment in EEZs.
As such, this study was primarily conducted using public AIS data
obtained from Global Fishing Watch [36,37]. Since WCPFC spatial and
temporal data on the occurrence of specific transshipment events is not
publicly available, this study focuses on AIS-observed encounters at sea
between purse seine vessels and refrigerated cargo vessels (i.e., reefers)
[38]. An AIS encounter, or potential transshipment, is defined as any
occurrence in which a reefer and a purse seine vessel are fewer than 500
m from each other for more than 2 h, while located more than 10 km
from any port [38]. Although transshipment is known to occur between
two fishing vessels, encounters between all other vessel types are
omitted to ensure a conservative estimate of purse seine transshipments.
Further, in order to target the primary tropical tuna fishing grounds, and
omit other target species within the WCPFC area of competence, the
study area was defined as the WCPFC convention area between 30◦ N
and 30◦ S latitude. A temporal range of 2014–2017 was chosen, as au
thors were not able to obtain verification of encounters for 2018–2019
from subregional organizations (e.g. PNA), and it was not possible to
include years prior to 2014 due to AIS data limitations.
3. Results and discussion
Assessing encounters at sea between purse seiners and reefers, 77
potential transshipments were identified between 28 unique reefers, and
2
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Second, the practice of transshipping between fishing vessels—which
are usually smaller in size than refrigerated cargo vessels, and thus
under the IMO size requirement—is widely acknowledged in the Pacific
[44], increasing the potential for undetected transshipment between
vessels not requiring AIS (Table 1, AIS limitation 1). A third limitation
potentially resulting in the underestimation of transshipment at sea is
the fact that AIS is not tamper-proof, and individual vessels may alter
their identities and locations, or turn off their AIS transponders (Table 1,
AIS limitation 3). This represents a potential violation of existing in
ternational or even national AIS regulations, and may prevent detection
specifically of illegal behaviors.
The three limitations above represent possible false negatives,
leading to an underestimation of transshipment at sea. The solutions to
most of these limitations are regulatory in nature, and relate to overall
AIS adoption and oversight (Table 1). However, as a remotely sensed
data source, AIS also has the potential to create false positive errors,
over-identifying diverse encounters at sea as transshipment of fish.
These potential false positives may lead to the overestimation of trans
shipment at sea, and need to be triangulated with other qualitative and
non-remotely sensed data to understand specific on-vessel activities.
To reduce the potential for overestimation, we sought to triangulate
results with regional and national observer data (Fig. 3). On the regional
level, ideal data sources included WCPFC VMS data, annual reports, and
observer reports, however, as previously mentioned, these are not
considered public domain by the WCPFC. According to the 2007 WCPFC
Data Rules, WCPFC VMS data is not available to third parties, and would
require approval from all members, cooperating non-members and
participating territories (collectively, CCMs) to obtain the data [35].
Considering the high resolution required to triangulate findings (e.g.
vessel flag states, dates, times, etc.) and low likelihood of unanimous
approval (e.g. to the authors’ knowledge, this data has never been
granted to non-members) [45], WCPFC VMS data was considered
infeasible for the purpose of this study and for overall third-party
assessment of traceability, verifiability, and legality. WCPFC Annual
reports were also explored to verify these encounters, however the
Annual Report on Transshipping published by the Secretariat only
covers high seas transshipments as reported by longliners and carriers,
with a resolution of flag state rather than vessel. Furthermore, CCM
Annual Report Part 1 demonstrated inconsistent to non-existent data on
carrier vessels, with only occasional reports for transshipment in port
[30]. Without at-sea transshipment information including purse seine
vessels, annual report information was also deemed ineffective for
triangulating AIS results. The last regional source of data with the po
tential to elucidate the nature of these encounters at sea was WCPFC
observer data. However, while the Conservation and Management
Measure (CMM) on Regulation of Transshipment requires that observers
be on all carriers to observe high seas transshipments, there is no
requirement for carrier vessel observer reports to be submitted to the
Secretariat (e.g. 1 observer report was submitted for 956 transshipments
in 2016 and none for the 1092 transshipments reported in 2017).
Considering the above limitations in the availability or resolution of
qualitative WCPFC transshipment information, no regional data was
appropriate to clarify the nature of the observed encounters at sea be
tween purse seine vessels and reefers.
In addition to regional data sources, we further identified two
sources of sub-regional information that might assist in elucidating the
identified encounters. Of the 77 observed encounters, 34 occurred
within waters of states that are Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)
(Fig. 3). As PNA states have 100% observer coverage, it was possible to
apply that qualitative information to the 34 eligible encounters [46].
Review by the PNA verified 25 encounters as observed
non-transshipment, primarily consisting of provisioning, salt, spare
parts, and exchange of crew members. Of the remaining nine encoun
ters, seven lacked access to hard copy reports, and two were “unable to
find transshipment” (Fig. 3). Both of these unverified encounters
occurred between the same fishing and reefer vessels in 2017 in the

39 unique purse seine vessels (Fig. 1). The distribution of these en
counters increased from year to year, likely due in large part to AIS data
improvements within the Global Fishing Watch platform (e.g. 10 en
counters in 2014, 14 in 2015, 25 in 2016, 28 in 2017) [39]. These 77
encounters occurred in eight different EEZs (n = 72) as well as on the
high seas (n = 5) (Fig. 2) (Fig. 3). The most frequent flag states to
encounter each other included Panama-flagged reefers with Papua New
Guinea-flagged purse seiners (n = 13), Korea-flagged reefers with
Korea-flagged purse seiners (n = 11), and Korea-flagged reefers with
Kiribati-flagged purse seiners (n = 10) (Fig. 1). The primary reefer flag
states involved in these encounters included Panama (n = 33), Korea (n
= 23), and Vanuatu (n = 16), two of which (Panama and Vanuatu) are
considered open registry, or “flags of convenience” States, with notably
lax oversight [40]. Despite the limited number of encounters, distinct
spatial trends emerge in the encounter behavior of flag-based fleets
(Fig. 2). For example, encounters with Korean-flagged fishing vessels
occur throughout the range of the Western and Central Pacific tropical
tuna waters, whereas US and Taiwanese-flagged fishing vessel encoun
ters are more concentrated in the Western part, and the high seas en
counters are almost strictly attributed to fishing vessels flagged to
Kiribati.
AIS data provides an opportunity to analyze encounter behavior of
vessels at sea in an open-source, transparent way, unmediated by any
specific governing body (e.g. state or RFMO-based data). However, the
details and resolution of AIS are not equal to that of the VMS data
collected and used within WCPFC. AIS data is currently constrained by
technical and regulatory limitations that could lead to false assumptions,
and requires further data or analysis to corroborate (Table 1). First, AIS
is currently only internationally required by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) on vessels over 300 gross tons undertaking inter
national voyages [41]. Many vessels licensed within the Western and
Central Pacific are under this size requirement, and since international
voyages are defined as those in which a vessel embarks from one port
and lands in the port of another country [42], transshipment at sea is by
nature a means of avoiding this designation, if primarily for the eco
nomic reasons of reducing costs. Additionally, fishing vessels are spe
cifically exempt from these regulations within the IMO Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS) Convention [43]. For these regulatory reasons, it is highly
likely that a large number of encounters are not detected because one or
both vessels do not broadcast AIS (Table 1, AIS limitation 1 and 2).

Fig. 1. Matrix of observed AIS encounters between purse seine fishing vessels
and reefers, by vessel flag state, 2014–2017. The size of the symbol and cor
responding number indicate the observed encounters between fishing vessel
and reefer vessel flags during the study period.
3
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Fig. 2. Map of observed encounters between refrigerated cargo vessels and purse seiners.

Fig. 3. Summary of 1) primary transshipment compliance questions, 2) RFMO and additional data that was unavailable (crossed out) and that which was used
(boxed), and 3) the number of encounters evaluated with available data. Only the 25 encounters confirmed as non-transshipment of fish by subregional data are
considered verified, while the remaining 52 are unverified, and thus potentially illegal transshipments of fish. Sources for transshipment compliance questions
include: 1Convention article 1(e); 2Convention article 24(4); 3Convention article 29(5); 4CMM 2009-06 Conservation and Management measure on the regulation of
transshipment Section 2; 5Convention article 28(6)e; 6CMM 2009-06 Conservation and Management measure on the regulation of transshipment Section 1(14).

waters of Japan and Tuvalu. Eight additional encounters fell within the
purview of states within the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), for whom
the Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC) collects data via the
regional observer program. The study was unable to access this data so
these eight encounters were unable to be verified.

4. Conclusions and recommendations
Applying all available information from public (i.e., Global Fishing
Watch), regional (i.e., WCPFC) and subregional (i.e., PNA) sources, 32%
(n = 25) of the observed encounters between purse seiners and reefers
are verifiable as non-transshipments of fish (Fig. 3). Thus, only this 32%
of the observed encounters are considered verified, while the remaining
68% (n = 52) are unverified, and thus potentially illegal transshipments
4
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managed species caught in the Convention area should provide elec
tronic notification of their entry into WCPFC waters and intention to
transship while in Convention area waters to the relevant flag State and
the Secretariat. That notification should include confirmation of the
vessel’s compliance with near-real-time VMS reporting and observer
carriage requirements to allow authorities to verify the information
prior to any at-sea transshipment activity commencing. Second, in
consistencies in monitoring and reporting undermine the data validity.
For example, the template provided by the Secretariat for transshipment
reporting should be expanded to include data fields for number of off
loading and receiving vessels involved in transshipping, and locations
where transshipping events occurred (e.g. high seas, EEZs, in port) [48].
This will allow cross-validation of vessel transshipment reporting and
prevent inconsistency between offloading and receiving vessels. The
Regional Observer Program (ROP) Standards and Guidelines should also
be revised to mandate that carrier observers be specifically trained and
certified to carry out their duties on a carrier vessel. In addition, it
should mandate the submission of observer reports for all high seas
transshipments occurring within the WCPFC Convention Area to enable
the Secretariat to review, cross-verify and facilitate independent vali
dation of reported transshipment information. Finally, and most sub
stantially, current approaches to data sharing prevent any evaluation
from outside actors or true transparent governance. To address this, the
Commission could establish or expand formal transshipping
data-sharing procedures with other RFMOs (e.g. NPFC, IATTC and
SPRFMO), especially where authorized carrier vessels operate within
overlapping convention area waters, conduct multiple transshipments,
and transship species managed by different RFMOs during a single
voyage [30]. The Commission could also update its data rules and
procedures to modernize and clarify data sharing procedures with
non-members and observers, to enhance transparency, enable effective
supply chain audits, improve cross-verification and coordination, and
strengthen the legitimacy and the social license of these fisheries.
The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate transparency in
transboundary fisheries governance by asking whether the public has
sufficient information to hold RFMOs accountable to their mandate. We
based the study in one of the most commercially and ecologically
important fisheries, assessing a highly-regulated activity within the
RFMO considered to have the strongest policies [21,22,49]. However,
even within this arguably “best practice” scenario, we found that there is
not sufficient information to hold governing bodies (e.g. states, RFMO)
accountable to their mandate of ensuring “effective conservation and
management” [15]. Similar states of transparency and insufficient
reporting requirements are found within the transshipment manage
ment frameworks of the other four global tuna RFMOs, as evidenced
through recent comparative analyses of reported transshipment activ
ities. The studies collectively concluded, in part, that the availability of
public information related to the occurrence and reporting of trans
shipment events in all of the tuna RFMOs was lacking, preventing the
ability for any organization to independently verify transshipment data or even to perform simple audit functions [50–54].
On the surface, this failure of transparency and accountability is due
primarily to the non-public nature of valuable RFMO data and to sub
stantial gaps in the conservation and management measures at play
within RFMOs. However, these barriers are not attributable to a simple
lack of technical or administrative capacity, and deeper dynamics un
derlie immediate explanations. Tensions between different institu
tions—such as the neoliberal market structures that dominate global
fisheries and the States that are charged with managing them—may
ultimately limit authentic or transformative transparency in trans
boundary fisheries [1,8]. For example, Petersson et al. found that fishing
industry representatives were the most prevalent, consistent, and
embedded non-state actors at RFMO meetings, often attending meetings
as participants within member state delegations [55]. This industry
involvement far outpaced that of civil society organizations, indicating
substantially greater opportunities for industry representatives to

Table 1
Summary of current limitations with AIS data, the analytical outcomes resulting
from those limitations, and potential solutions.
Analytical
error

AIS limitation

Analytical
outcome

Potential solution

Possible
false
negative

1) Encounters where
both vessels do not
have AIS (and are not
currently required to)
2) Encounters where
one vessel does not
have AIS (and is not
currently required to)

Underestimation of
transshipment at
sea

Expand AIS adoption
requirements; use
additional data
sources
Expand AIS adoption
requirements; use
additional data
sources; possible to
analyze encounterlike behavior of
single vessels
Increase oversight
and enforcement of
current AIS
requirements
Triangulate with
observer data and
other narrative or
anecdotal sources

Possible
false
positive

Underestimation of
transshipment at
sea

3) Encounters where
1 or both vessels have
tampered or off AIS

Underestimation of
transshipment at
sea

4) Cannot separate
transshipment of fish
from other
encounters

Overestimation of
transshipment at
sea

of fish. As such, this study determined that for one of the most highly
regulated and monitored transboundary fisheries in the world, it is not
possible to verify transshipment—and thus traceability, legality, or
impact on fish stocks—for the vast majority of observed encounters.
Several limitations currently constrain the ability to assess trans
shipment at sea, even in this highly-regulated scenario. First, the ma
jority of regional WCPFC data is considered to be non-public domain
data, severely limiting access by both members and third parties (Fig. 3).
While substantial political will exists within WCPFC toward sharing
operational data for research purposes, lack of clarity around data
sharing procedures, and ambiguity in decision making requirements, de
facto prevent their use in transshipment evaluation [32,35,47]. Second,
the Secretariat likewise makes no regular assessment of this non-public
domain data for the verification of transshipment activities. With no
regular oversight and no formal data sharing arrangements with third
parties or other RFMOs on transshipment-specific information (e.g.
IATTC, NPFC) [30], this data is largely ineffective at ensuring trace
ability and legality. Third, while some transshipment regulations are in
place, their current structure does not require sufficient reporting (e.g.
observer reports) or resolution (e.g. annual reports) to enable adequate
verification or accountability. Sub-regional regulations and policies are
able to bridge some of that gap, but these institutions also lack regular
oversight, and the vast majority of encounters (68%) remain unsub
stantiated even after triangulating with diverse data sources.
In tracing encounters at sea, this study identifies three primary areas
for improving the traceability and transparency of transshipment at sea
within our case study. First, current reporting mechanisms are insuffi
cient to achieve the goals they were constructed for. The current WCPFC
transshipment measure (CMM 2009–06) should be strengthened, to
require consistent transshipment reporting for all areas within the
Convention Area, including all transshipments that occur in port and
within EEZs. This should include requirements that transshipments be
reported to the relevant flag State, coastal State, and port State, as well
as the WCPFC secretariat, in a standardized format, using IMO numbers
as each vessel’s primary identifier. Reporting requirements should also
include strict submission timeframes that ensure proper notification to
all relevant authorities. In all cases this reporting should occur before
the first point of landing for the catch is reached, regardless where the
transshipment event occurred. These requirements will allow the
Secretariat to receive a complete picture of transshipment activity,
wherever that activity occurs within the WCPFC Convention area, and
facilitate the cross-validation of reported information. In addition, all
WCPFC-authorized carrier vessels intending to transship WCPFC5
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influence policy-making [55]. Where the interests of public information
and accountable resource governance are in tension with the interests of
commercial actors, transformative transparency is highly unlikely.
Additionally, Gupta suggests that shortcomings in transparency are
related to “power imbalances and broader conflicts over norms, prac
tices and objectives” [1]. In addition to the tensions between market and
state forces, transparency is also undermined by asymmetries in power
relations between actors and their divergent goals. For example, with
regard to other mandates of RFMOs (e.g. deterring illegal fishing, allo
cation of fishing rights), scholars have found that frequently the interests
of more wealthy, powerful, developed nations have predominantly won
out [56–58].
This study suggests that there is much room for improvement in
transparency and accountability of transboundary fisheries manage
ment. In a highly-regulated “best case” scenario, sufficient information
is not available for the public to evaluate the legality and legitimacy of
dominant fishing practices. However, a key step moving forward will be
highlighting the underlying dynamics that inhibit transparency, rather
than stopping short at data limitations or flawed policies. Transparency
is important not only as a principle in itself, but because it is key in
holding authorities accountable to their goals of sustainable use. In the
context of global fisheries, this mandate, and the role of the public in
ensuring its achievement, are essential to ensure the effective conser
vation and management of fish stocks, both now and into the future.
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